Somali Women and the Socialist State

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Abstract
The Somali government under President Mohamed Siad Barre was the first to introduce laws and policies that promoted gender equality. One of the most radical laws that came out of this state-driven advancement of women’s rights was the Family Law of 1975. This paper examines Somali women’s relationship with the state and how they gained or lost from policies that targeted them. The majority of Somali women were unable to exercise many of the newfound rights that were bestowed upon them by Barre’s regime. The Family Law, in particular, may have been more harmful than beneficial to women’s rights and public perception on gender equality.
Introduction

Women have no share in the arrangements of this world and the laws governing it were made by men to their own advantage. By God, by God, men are the enemies we ourselves raised and nursed at our breasts, but they have crippled us and we cannot share peace with them.

- Hassan Sheikh Mumin, Shabeel Naagood

When Somali President “Jaalle” Mohamed Siad Barre came to power on October 21, 1969 through a bloodless military coup, he promised to change the political and social status quo with which much of the population had become dissatisfied. Women, in particular, had been an integral part of the nationalist independence movement, only to be sidelined politically by the post-independence democratic governments. The revolutionary socialist program Barre’s regime adopted included the liberation of women from both traditional and capitalist exploitation. Like the anti-colonial nationalist movement, the socialist Somali state identified and targeted Somali women as a strong support base, and mobilized them in two notable ways: as booyoyinka kacaanka (“the mothers of the revolution”), and in the form of the Somali Women’s Democratic Organization, which had branches across the country.

The most controversial law that emerged from this state-driven advancement of women’s rights was the 1975 Family Law, which allowed women and men to inherit wealth equally following the death of a family member; restricted polygamy; and gave women the right to seek divorce from their husbands. Traditionally, gender roles were particularly stringent when it came to issues relating to the family and decision-making. Women were expected to be docile, obedient wives and mothers while men were expected to be protectors and providers of the family, thus making them the main decision maker in the family. The family law was intended to alter gender and social relations of domination and power through which women and men gain access to power and material resources, or are allocated status within Somali society.

After the law was announced, Somali religious leaders criticized the law (and the regime) for going against Islam, the national religion. In response, the state executed, imprisoned, or exiled those who spoke out. This extreme reaction led to a deep divide within Somali society between the state and religion. The state viewed religion as a guise through which dissidents could subvert and overthrow the state. Religious groups saw the state overturning hundreds of years of tradition and religious guidance. Family relations are traditionally regulated by customary law and religious jurisprudence. Therefore, the family law impacted the role of the religious leaders in the society. Hence, the state was viewed with suspicion for trying to secularize society, and for reinterpreting Islam in a way that did not conform to traditional norms.

Women fell into the cracks of the divide between state and religion. As loyal supporters of the government, they were given certain benefits. However, by accepting the liberation that the state provided, it placed them in a position of confrontation with those who were defending the traditional status quo. The idea of gender equality was permanently tainted

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2Jaalle is the Somali translation of the socialist “comrade.”


4These prescribed gender roles did not necessarily reflect the reality of Somali women and these roles differed by class and setting (urban, pastoralist, agricultural).

by its association with an increasingly repressive state, which did not allow for debate on the seismic changes it was attempting to make on Somali social relations.6

Women gained clear advances from the military regime, with access to education and economic opportunities being broadly promoted, but in the political realm, women continued to remain excluded from any real political power. Further, the early advancements in female literacy, education, and economic participation were offset by the increasing militarization of the state, as it embedded itself in regional conflicts. Women were political pawns in a game that Barre’s state was to ultimately lose.7

State Feminism

Although President Barre would never refer to his policies as feminist, the advancement of women was an important rhetorical platform for the state.8 It was part of the revolutionary scientific socialist ideology that Siad Barre’s government espoused after coming to power. Despite the fact that the country had no history of class conflict, tribalism was equated with class in a society struggling to liberate itself from distinctions imposed by lineage group affiliation. I.M. Lewis defines this new distinctly Somali form of scientific socialism adopted by the state “as ‘wealth-sharing based on wisdom’ (hanti–wadadaagga ilmi ku diisan), [which] is closely linked with such key concepts as ‘unity’ or ‘togetherness’ (waaddajir), ‘self-reliance’ (is ku kasoonaan), and ‘self-help’ (iska wax u qabso).”9 This new socialism was a socialism that was flexible and could forgo central tenants of socialist ideology entirely. On the other hand, it was an attempt to indigenize certain forms of socialist thought in a country that did not have the social structures that made socialist revolution possible (or necessary) elsewhere. Somalis also viewed socialism with suspicion on the basis of allegations about its secularity and the regime’s difficult relationship with the religious establishment. There is no doubt that socialist ideology played an important role in bringing to the fore a vision of Somali modernity that included gender equality.

The state’s women’s division was organized on March 8 1977 under the Somali Women’s Democratic Organization (SWDO), although earlier women’s groups existed as part of the apparatus of the state.10 The headquarters of the SWDO was located in front of the Hawo Tako statue in Mogadishu. Hawo Tako was a member of the Somali Youth League, the anti-colonial nationalist party, who was killed during an anti-Italian demonstration on January 11 1948.11 Safia Aidid argues that by constructing this statue and using her as an image of the “tyranny of colonialism”, the state was able to domesticate her memory, and the Somali women that she symbolized, in a narrative that portrayed them as tragic victims rather than “politically engaged [actors] in the nationalist struggle.”12 This is an important and telling example of the ways in which women were used in the state’s ideology.

Another example is hooyooyinka kacaanka, or “the mothers of the revolution”, which was a type of organizing done by women through which they expressed their undying

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6Jaalle is the Somali translation of the socialist “comrade.”
7The Barre regime fell in January 1991.
8In a speech given on the opening of the Somali Women Democratic Organization, he condemned the idea of feminism, saying, “[Feminists] go against all and sundry, both those who are with them and those who are their real exploiters under the mistaken concept of ‘feminism …’” Jaalle Mohamed Siad Barre, “Jaalle Siyaad’s Address at the SWDO Founding Congress,” Halkan (The Struggle) 1, no. 6 (1977): 12.
12Aidid, “Haweenku Wa Garab,” 104.
support for the regime and the leader. Referring to women as “the mothers of the revolution” was one form of nationalist discourse, which, like all nationalist discourses, was “inherently gendered.”

Siad Barre was known as aabe or the father. For example, one nationalist song calls him the father of knowledge, aabahii garashadha. All women then are symbolized as the mothers of the nation. With the father as the head of the family or the nation, the mother—and therefore every Somali woman—is relegated to a secondary or reproductive role. It is with closer examination of these patriarchal narratives constructed by the state that the discrepancies between the ideal—or perhaps present day notions of—gender equality and that which the state presented become apparent.

Those women in booyoyinka kacaanka participated in a knowing exchange in which “they avoided confrontation with the leadership of the military state so that they were perceived as allies, thereby receiving admiration and support from the state in return.” This sentiment was not limited to booyoyinka kacaanka and extended to most women’s relationship with the state. As Dahabo Farah, co-founder of the Somali Women’s Movement and activist, explains, “[Women] worked with the regime so that they won’t view us as negative. We played the politics. Our aim was to work within the system to ensure that there were no clashes.” For a state that punished all its dissidents severely, and which styled itself as committed to advancing women’s rights, this was a strategic choice for women.

The Somali Women’s Democratic Organization was headed by elite women who were chosen by the state. The organization was not an independent entity; state influence dominated the organization’s agenda and it worked on issues that the state prioritized and felt were relevant to women’s rights. As Dahabo Hassan et al. explain, the “SWDO makes use of the government machinery in matters that the State advocates and which are also in the interest of women” (emphasis added).

This was evident when Siad Barre referenced the passing of the Family Law of 1975 as following “the United Nations call on all countries to effect a meaningful advancement of women.” Further, and most detrimental of all, “the military government used SWDO as a tool to control Somali women.” Like booyoyinka kacaanka, the SWDO was another way to mobilize women to support and legitimate state policies. Moreover, the SWDO could be used to make it appear as if women were political actors in the government when in fact they were not. For example, the majority of supporters of the state’s party—

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16Quoted in Mohamed, “Multiple Challenges,” 126.
18Although published in 1995, this chapter was written in the 1980s, before the collapse of the state. Hassan et al., “Somalia: Poetry as Resistance against Colonialism and Patriarchy,” 173.
19One example was a woman who was divorced from her husband and evicted from her home. The SWDO intervened and took the case to court. The woman won her house back and received financial compensation from her former husband. Raqiya Haji Dualeh quoted in Mohamed, “Multiple Challenges,” 135-136.
21Barre, My Country and My People, 106.
the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party—were women. However, because the state was unwilling to give them real power, the SWDO could act as a cover where women’s attention could be focused. Thus, women and family matters became the only realms over which women held power at a national level.

Women, like their male compatriots, had access to the political process largely through their relationship to the existing elite, especially in the later years when it transformed into a nepotistic patron-client system. Even when women were participating in the government, they were often used as tokens, like the SWDO. Hawa Jibril, a renowned poet and anti-colonial activist, recited once in a poem,

O Secretary General, you also declared that ‘Women are a force the shortsighted cannot perceive.’
Is it fair to have only two women in our higher political offices?
[…]
Do they not deserve higher positions and rewards?
Or were you too hasty, and are having second thoughts?
Are you not tormented by the injustice they suffer?

In a militarized authoritarian state where one had to pledge undying loyalty to Siad Barre, and could at any point be accused of being a traitor, it was unlikely that more women in the higher ranks of government would have reflected women’s democratic participation in government. Still, the discrepancy between what was supposedly championed by the state and the few women in positions of power was telling.

These inconsistencies notwithstanding, it would be disingenuous to suggest that Siad Barre’s state policies provided no tangible benefits to women. Important reforms included maternal leave with pay, a strong state emphasis on girls’ education, and free healthcare. Hamdi Mohamed asserts “Women’s access to education, paid employment, social benefits and political participation increased during this period.” Orientation centers gave jobs to unemployed young people and acted as community centers where women could gather and take part in important national and social projects. Other significant gender-neutral reforms include free compulsory primary education, the 1974-1975 literacy campaign, and the writing of the Somali language, which helped to advance literacy in Somalia. More girls went to school under Siad Barre than ever before.

However, this system was not perfect and even force could not mitigate the challenges posed by cultural values that viewed the education of girls as futile. The militarization of the state further reversed the social advancements made by the government and many resources were reallocated to the military. Dini argues that this was most detrimental to women, many of whom “became widows as they lost their spouses to the war … [they] received no support from the regime, thus forcing them to become the primary income-earners for their families.” Further, Farah explains that it was educated “Middle class women who … were able to claim their rights. They were mostly the ones that benefited from the gender policies.” The majority of women, however, remained marginalized.

23“63 percent of the founding members of the SRSP are women. SRSP cells register women activists as 75 percent of their total,” Fadumo Alin, “Somali Women’s Report,” Halgan (The Struggle) 1, no. 6 (1977): 15.
24Ibid, 153.
27Ibid, 123.
30Ibid, 158.
The 1975 Family Law

In the context of modern Islamic societies, the home is often considered within the dominion of religious authorities and a place where the state cannot interfere, especially in issues where there exist Islamic norms and laws—this includes marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Siad Barre’s military government had been intervening in religious affairs long before the promulgation of this law. In an attempt to suppress religious movements throughout the country, the state relegated religious matters to the Ministry of Judicial and Religious Affairs, where it could try to control the national religious discourse.

At the international level, the Family Law emerged in the context of increased international emphasis on the status of women, especially in the United Nations, and was influenced by the Egyptian Family Code. From his interviews with members of the drafting committee, Abdurahman Abdullahi explains that they had been “closely connected with the Italian Communist Party” as well as “known leftists and cabinet members who were very close to the President.” Therefore, even prior to the drafting of the law, various ideological and political pressures were present.

Finally, on January 11 1975, the law was announced by presidential decree. January 11 was strategically chosen because it was the day Hawo Tako was killed decades earlier. The new law required divorces to be done through the court, where women and men could ask for the dissolution of the marriage. The law no longer made dowry a requirement for marriage; allowed for equal inheritance for men and women; and, put strong restrictions on polygyny. These were the most contentious articles that clashed directly with existing religious norms and laws and challenged the historical and social authority of religious leaders in Somalia. The new law still maintained the husband as the head of the family and stipulated that “the wife is obliged to follow her husband.” Further, women could only file for divorce from their husbands if they gave up their dowries, making divorce very difficult for financially disadvantaged women, a criticism highlighted by women’s groups.

Five days after the promulgation of the law, on January 16 1975, some sheikhs bravely denounced the law following Friday prayer at the famous Cabdulqaadir Mosque of Mogadishu, the site of a burgeoning Islamic movement. Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, who was present at the sermon, narrated the events as following:

After the Friday prayer in the famous Mosque of Cabdulqaadir, at about 1:00 pm, Sheikh Axmad Maxamad stood up and began to deliver his critical speech against the Family Law considering it “arrogant and a transgression of the borders of the Law of Allah that is unacceptable to the Somali Muslims.” Successive speeches by other Islamic scholars continued until the afternoon prayer at about 3:30 pm where as many as nine other Islamic scholars criticized the Law. Most of the people [who had] prayed in the mosque also remained listening enthusiastically. Moreover, many people gathered in the surrounding areas of the mosque in a show of support for the scholars. However, the event was perceived by the regime as an anti-state protest and a threat to the revolution. After

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32See Abdullahi, “Islamic Movement in Somalia” for attempts by the government to suppress Islamic movements. He explains this as having been done in order to suppress non-Marxist ideologies in order to maintain the supremacy and purity of the state’s scientific socialist ideology due to the new Ethiopian regime “competing with the Somali regime in soliciting Socialist countries’ patronage in the Horn of Africa” (184, 188-189).
34Ibid, 185-186.
36Articles 36 and 42 of the Family Law.
37Article 2 of the Family Law.
38Article 158 of Chapter II of the Family Law.
40Articles 4 and 33 of the Family Law.
41Mohamed, “Multiple Challenges,” 134.
the afternoon prayer (salat al-Asr), security forces encircled the mosque from all sides, cut off the electricity to silence the scholars, and arrested hundreds of people in the mosque. 43

Many of those arrested were prominent religious authorities who “belonged to the traditional jurists and Sufi orders.” 44 Immediately following their denouncement of the law, the National Security Court sentenced 10 sheikhs to public execution, 6 sheikhs to 30 years of imprisonment, and a further 17 sheikhs were sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment. 45 Under Law No. 54, “exploiting religion to create national disunity or to undermine and weaken the powers of the state” could incur the death penalty. 46 These denouncements confirmed the regime’s fear that the religious authorities were interested in subverting the state’s authority. 47 People from all sectors of the society, including prominent woman activist Maryan Cilmi, pleaded with the president to pardon the sheikhs but he refused. 48 Activists like Cilmi recognized that the blood of sheikhs would stain their cause for gender equality rather than help it. 49

The state predicted that the religious authorities would object to the law, and tried to quell dissent before it began. 50 In a speech on the day of the proclamation of the law, President Barre declared, “As from this day Somali men and women are equal.” 51 He called upon the nation to ignore the “bad wadads,” 52 who were sure to announce their discontent at the law soon, for they were “the ones who don’t know the value of human beings, or the ones who are opposed to equality, or the reactionaries and the imperialists who use them as cat paws, or those who want to sow the seeds of discord and who want to turn the hands of the clock back.” 53 Thus, those with legitimate religious authority were cast as agents for imperialism or general spoilers of the socialist project. This was ultimately a battle on who had true legitimacy, the state or the religious establishment.

The two enemies of the state were historical clan allegiances and anti-revolutionary or reactionary ideologies. The latter was code for emerging Islamist movements who, could at any time, sow distrust of the government, considering their enduring influence on society. 54 These movements ranged from young educated groups recently returning from Persian Gulf countries and introducing the Wahabi interpretation of Islam to Somali society 55 to long existing traditional Sufi brotherhoods. Moreover, these religious groups viewed Islam as incompatible with “godless” socialism. 56 To counter these ideas, in his speech on January 11, the president gave a revisionist interpretation of Islam, and the conditions on which the original family laws were inherited, trying to create connections between his regime’s ideology and the religion. In this interpretation, President Barre said that Islam, as “a correct Revolutionary Movement, waged war outright on the eradication of most of the evils that could be done away with, and took gradual steps towards the elimination of things that could not be wiped out without ripping the society apart.” 57 Therefore, in a society where contemporaries of the Prophet were still burying their newborn daughters alive, it would have been inconceivable to achieve full equality of men and women. President Barre was thereby following in the steps of the Prophet by legislating the full achievement of the true egalitarian message of the Qur’an.

43Ibid, 187.
44Ibid, 188, 192.
46Ibid, 172.
48Ducaale, Interview with Maryan Cilmi, Xusuus Reeb, Horn Cable TV, January 24, 2014.
49Ibid.
50Ibid, 187.
51Barre, My Country and My People, 106.
52Wadad is a Somali word for Sheikh or a Muslim leader.
53Barre, My Country and My People, 106.
54Ibid, 189.
57Barre, My Country and My People, 107.
How did this new law affect Somali women? Were they able to take advantage of these newfound rights in light of a strong societal backlash? The short answer to this question is “no”. Women “constituted the majority of the illiterate population” and, thus, by simply having no knowledge of the law or how to navigate the “male-dominated” legal system, could not exercise it.\(^5\) Other women were afraid to be associated with anti-Islamic behavior that the law connoted. Therefore, only a limited number of women actually used this new law. Even then, however, because these were familial issues and dealing with them publicly could bring shame to the family, many cases “never passed beyond the local police station and were never referred to the courts. When [they did] end up in the courts, it was common for these cases to be ‘taken out’ of the courts by clan elders of the two conflicting parties and solved according to tradition [i.e. customary law].\(^6\) At other times, judges would urge families to settle matters outside of the court because using the Family Law would have “consequences for their faith.”\(^7\)

Paradoxically, although the law put strong prohibitions on polygyny, Abdullahi claims that this “drastically increased.”\(^8\) Religious figures and even individuals close to the regime boycotted the law by marrying multiple wives.\(^9\) Abdullahi further asserts that the law led to increased levels of domestic violence and divorce. This was because women felt more empowered to openly challenge traditional patriarchal familial roles. With more economic opportunities open to them, women were now actively supporting their families financially and felt they had a right to take part in the decision-making that they had never dared to take part in formerly. Further, the state “employed [women in] the intelligence service to watch for ‘enemies of the Revolution’—particularly the wives of individuals suspected of opposing the regime.”\(^10\) This created suspicion and disharmony in families. By the 1980s, the law was no longer sustainable in light of the strong societal reluctance to use it. Due to “the cumulative internal and external opposition” to the Barre regime, which saw its power weakening, the law was eventually revised with many of its radical articles taken out.\(^11\)

**Conclusion**

The promotion of women’s rights by the socialist state of Siad Barre was a political move to marginalize his domestic enemies, bolster his relationship with his loyal women’s support base, and enhance Somalia’s image abroad. However, despite the existing political and legal mechanisms available to them, in most matters, women worked “around the state” to advance their interests.\(^12\) Those women that could manipulate the enacted laws were educated, urban and middle class, and represented only a small segment of Somali women. The state could not project its power outside urban areas and, in particular, the state’s power was centered on the capital, Mogadishu. In rural areas, women continued to rely on *xeer* (customary law) and other mechanisms for their own protection.\(^13\)

The socialist government’s public support for women was likely more structurally detrimental to women than liberating, as “the concept of women’s emancipation—already controversial in this period of rapid change—became associated with a regime that was ever more obviously oppressive.”\(^14\) It appears that the law had more to do with disempowering...
traditional religious authority than with advancing women’s rights. The public commitment to women made by the government in the 1970s would later be hollowed out, as the state became increasingly militarized. There were never enough resources or attention applied to these laws and reforms to make long-term structural change in Somali society. Further, as can be observed from the SWDO, hooyooyinka kacaanka and the co-option of Hawo Tako’s legacy, there existed “pressure on women to articulate their gender interests within the terms set by nationalist discourse.” The liberation of women that the state presented put forth new models of womanhood that were in their own ways restricting, especially in light of the religious and societal backlash that came with them.

Bibliography


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69 Ibid, 156.